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PERCEPTIONS OF EQUITY AND
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
ABSTRACT
This paper builds a simple model where there is a connection between employees’
perception of the “fairness” of employers and the actual distribution of income. Wages are based
in part on employers’ assessments of the productivity of individual employees. I show that the
equilibrium distribution of income depends on the beliefs of employees concerning the accuracy
of these evaluations. I give conditions under which the distribution of income across employees
of the same vintage is more equal if employees believe that these evaluations are generally
inaccurate (so that they are skeptical of capitalists in general) than when they believe that these
evaluations are accurate. The model is consistent with the fact that, in a sample of seven
countries, the distribution of income is more unequal in countries where people feel that income
inequality is not too large.
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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and NBERPeople have opinions about the degree to which the differences in pay reflect differences
in productivity. In particular, they have views on the extent to which differences in inmme
reflect, instead, personal connect ions, are the result of favoritism or result from capricious
decisions by people with influence, In this paper, I show that opinions of this sort can
affect the actual distribution of income even when they do not affect individuals’ abilities.
In particular, a change in the degrm to which people believe that differences in pay reflect
differences in productivity can change the actual income of people even if their marginal
product remains unchanged. 1
My focus on the effects of these beliefs raises the question of where these beliefs come
from. In particular, there is the issue of whether people’s perceptions about the degree to
which individual income reflects individual productivity shouldn’t be identical to the actual
connection between income and pay. In this paper, I allow the actual connection between
these variables to differ from the perceived connection and I do this for two remons,
First, it is very difficult to know what the actual connection between productivity and
pay actually is. If one leaves aside the possibility of experimenting by varying one’s own
productivity, it is very hard to learn about this connection unless one actually observes the
output of different people. 2 But, in modern industrial firms where workers are extremely
interdependent and where the aggregate value produced by the firm is subject to large ran-
dom disturbances, measuring the output of individuals is very hard. There are, of course,
indirect me=urements of the relationship between productivity and pay. Under the assump-
tions of the stripped down model I present, for instance, this relationship can be learned by
measuring the changes in the income of people who change jobs. However, the extent to
which statistia of this sort, shed light on the issue depends on auxiliary assumptions, the
validity of which is itself difficult to establish empirically. That is not to say that different
lThe paper is closely related to Piketty (1995) where changes in the perceived connection between effort
and income change the equilibrium level of effort and thus change actual income. The difference is that in
Piketty (1995) these changed beliefs Meet actual income only by first affecting the potential productivity of
individuals.
2This too is closely related to Piketty ’s (1995) argument that it is difficult to learn the connection between
effort and pay.individuals do not contribute differently to firm output or that people do not have estimates
of what these differences are. It is just that these estimates are based on pieces of informa-
tion that are hard to communicate between people so that it is difficult to obtain “objective”
estimates of individual productivity.
The second reason to consider models where the perceived connection between pay and
productivity differs from the actual one is that people do not appear to agree on this connec-
tion. A particularly telling set of examples of this disagreement can be found in Hochschild
(1981), who reports on twenty eight in-depth interviews about the distribution of resources.
Summarizing she says (p. 140), “The poor . . .often argue that if productivity were truly
rewarded, this would create more equal incomes (italics in original). ” And goes on to say
(p. 141) “On the other hand, wealthy respondents . . .often argue that if productivity were
truly rewarded, this would create less equal income. ” 3 This sort of disagreement is con-
sistent with the earlier claim that people find it difficult to communicate effectively their
information about the way the economy works.
Because firms perceive the productivity of different people to be different, they will pay
different people different amounts. Indeed, in the case of a frictionless competitive labor
market, the wage of an individual is equal to that individual’s marginal product. Opinions
about whether people are or are not paid their marginal product do not alter this so that
the have no effect on the actual distribution of income.
In the model I present, there are two departures from the assumptions of the standard
competitive labor market which ensure that these opinions matter. First, I suppose that a
worker’s departure from a firm depends on his outside opportunitia and that the firm has
imperfect information about these opportunities. The result is that employers have some
monopsony power and that wages depend both on the firm’s perception of their employees’
marginal products, and on the firm’s =sessment of the likelihood that these employees will
3These differences are consistent with those found in larger surveys. McClosky and Zaller (1984) report
that 84~0 of rmpondents whose family income is above $35000 view the capitalist system as fair and efficient
while only 51% of respondents with lower income do so. This type of statement may simply reflect different
txtes for redistribution but it aho could reflect differences in opinions about the determinants of individual
incomes.
2leave. Second, there are search costs so that workers have to forman opinion about what
they will bepaidon theoutside before they leave a firm.
This combination of assl.~mptions yields a simple mechanism by which opinions affect the
distribution of income. If workers regard the evaluations of their employers as inaccurate,
they are tempted to quit if they receive a low evaluation while they are inclined to stay
if they remive a favorable one. The reason is that, if capitalists are inaccurate, it is good
to work for a firm that h~ an inaccurately high estimate of one’s own ability. Employees
who receive high ratings from their current employers conclude that they have found a good
match while those who receive a low rating expect alternate employers to pay higher wages.
Thus, the perception that capitalists have become more accurate makes workers that
have received a low rating from their firm more likely to stay (because they now expect a
low rating from other firm as well). A monopsonistic firm then tends to cut their wages.
Similarly, this change in perception leads workers that have gotten a high rating to be more
willing because they are no longer afraid of getting low wages from alternate employers.
This, in turn, tends to raise their wages. Since the wages of highly rated employees rise
while those of employees with low ratings fall, inequality increases.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the model and studies how the wage
distribution changes in response to changed perceptions by workers of the accuracy of firm’s
evaluations. Section 2 considers social efficiency, and, in particular, studies whether overall
output in the economy rises or falls when workers deem firms to be more accurate. The mea-
sure of overall output I consider is, in some sense, a welfare measure because it includ= the
nonpecuniary utility that people get in their jobs. One difficulty with evaluating aggregate
outcomes is that one needs an “objective” measure of firms’ ability to evaluate workers and,
for the reasons I mentioned it is hard to know how one would go about obtaining one. For
the purpose at hand, I pretend that firms have an accurate msessment of their own ability to
judge individuals’ productivity. This leads me to use the firms’ estimates of their accuracy
in computing the model’s predictions regarding aggregate output.
The main conclusion of this section is a negative one. For reasons I explain, there appears
3to be no robust connection between overall output and the beliefs of workers. Even when
workers’ beliefs become more accurate in the sense of getting closer to the capitalists beliefs
that are used to evaluate social output, overall output can fall. Thus, my model is one where
there not be a trade-off between equity and efficiency: for certain parameter values it is
possible to increase both at the same time. I also show that simpler measures of output like
the amount of output that is produced to be sold in the market (which, like GNP, is readily
observable) do not give an accurate picture of whether overall output (which includes the
enjoyment people derive from their jobs) incre~es. Thus it is possible that an increase in
workers’ perception of distributional equity leads to an increase in inequality together with
a fall in overall output, even though a measure of market output such as GNP rises.
Sections 1 and 2 focus on inequality across individuals whose publicly observable char-
acteristics are identical. The individuals differ only in the evaluation made of them by their
employers and this information is held privately by individuals and their employers. In Sec-
tion 3, I show that one can reinterpret the model so that it applies also to the inequality
of wages between people who differ in observable characteristics like education. Section 4
discusses the empirical applicability of the model. In particular, it discusses measurements of
people’s opinions about income inequality and studies the connection of these opinions with
the actual distribution of income. It shows that, across a sample of seven countries, actual
inequality is negatively correlated with the perception
This is in broad accordance with the predictions of my
that income inequality is excessive.
model. Section 5 concludes.
1 The Model
1.1 The Basic Structure
Employees are of two types. I suppose that those for whom a parameter T is equal to one
have higher productivity, at least in certain occupations, than those for whom the parameter
T is equal to zero. I will suppose that T is not observable, though certain firms do observe
signals that are correlated with the true value of T. The focus of my study is the connection
4between employee beliefs about the accuracy of firms signals about T and the wages that
firms pay in equilibrium.
There are two periods. In the first period, each employee starts out attached to a firm.
This attachment implies on!y that the firm has observed a signal S that is correlated with T.
After seeing this signal, the employee’s initial firm can make him an offer. This offer specifies
a wage that the employee earns in the first period assuming that he works at the original
firm (which I label o) during this period. If the employee stays in firm o, his contribution to
the firm’s first period output depends on his type T. In particular, the value of the output
he produces is given by q + VT where q and v are parameters. Firm o, however, does not
observe these individual outputs even after the first period is over. To rationalize this, one
can imagine that the firm’s actual output is contaminated by so much noise that it contains
negligible information about the employee’s productivity. Alternatively, one can imagine
that the value of the employee’s output accrues over time and that the effect on firm output
of employees of different productivities is not detected until much after the employees have
left the firm. The result, in any event, is that the firm’s only indication of the employee’s
productivity at the start of the second period is the realization of S.
Before the employee either accepts or rejects the first period offer from firm o, he also
receives an outside offer from an alternative firm that I will label al. I assume that this
outside firm offers him a wage equal to g. 4 By being in this alternative firm, the employ-
also gains nonpecuniary utility which is equivalent to an additional compensation of n.
Abusing the language somewhat, I thus treat him as receiving a total compensation of g + n,
where I am including the nonpecuniary utility in his compensation. The value of n is drawn
from a distribution whose cumulative density function is F(n). For much of the analysis,
I will focus on the special case where F represents the uniform distribution, with density
4The simpl=t rationalization for this is there are actually two alternative firms in which the individual
has a productivity ~ and that the employee gets the same nonpecuniary utility in both. If each of these
firms gets to make one wage offer to the employee then the logic of Bertrand competition leads them to offer
him ~. An alternative interpretation would include in J not only the value of the employee’sfirst period
output but also the value of the information about the employee’stype that the alternative firm can expect
to acquire. I neglect this because it would complicate the analysis.
5equal to h for n between O and I/h. 5
If the employee works for al, a new firm which I label b observes a new signal R which is
also correlated with the employee’s T. If the employee works for firm h in the second period,
his output is, once again, given by q + vT. Because this firm cares about the employee’s
type, it will make him an offer that depends on its best estimate of the probability that the
employee has a T equal to one. I assume that the nonpecuniary utility that the employ=
derives at this new firm is equal to zero.
In the second period, the employee also gets an offer from an alternative firm that I
denote by a2. I assume that he gets this offer whether he worked for o or al in the first
period. Firm a2, just like al offers a wage ~. G I also use n to denote the value (in terms of
wages) of the employee’s ncnpecuniary utility at a2 and this too is drawn from F(n) though
this realization is independent of the one that gives nonpecuniary utility at al.
Thus, in period 1, the employee can work at either o or al. If he works at o, he can work
at either o or a2 in the second period. If he works at al, he can work at either b or a2 in the
second period. Note that I have assumed that the employee enjoys nonpecuniary utility only
at those jobs (al and a2) where his productivity does not depend on his type. This, as well
as well as the assumption that nonpecuniary utility is uncorrelated over time in jobs where
the employee type is unimportant, simplifies the analysis considerably without, hopefully,
having a material effect on the results.
My analysis of the model proceeds as follows. In the next subsection, I consider equilib-
rium wages in the second period at firms o and b. Then, I study expected compensation in
the second period. This differs from expected wages at o and b because the individuals have
the option of working in alternate firms where they also get nonpecuniary compensation.
Finally, the fourth subsection d=cribes the equilibrium wages at firm o in the first period.
‘Using zero u the lower bound for the realizations of n does not reduce the generality of the analysis
since one can think of the lowest value for n as being incorporated in J.
6Again this can be rationalized by the assumption that there are two such firms and that their circum-
stances are identical.
61.2 Second Period Wages
Employers o and b know that employees will leave and go to a2 if they are offered a wage
w that is lower than the employee’s realization of ~ + n. On the other hand, the expected
benefit from keeping an employee to which the firm pays w is (q + vET – w), where ET
represents the firm’s expectation of the employee’s T. Thus, these employers set their wage
offers w to maximize
F(w – q)[q + VET – w]
where E takes expectations conditional on the information available to the firm.
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal w, w*, satisfies the first order condition
f(w” - q)[q
The second order condition requires
f’[9
+ VET – 10”]– F(W* – g) = o
that
+vET–w*]–2f<o
Differentiating (2) with respect to ET, ; and w*, one obtains
dw- = —
f f - f’[9 + “ET - w*1 dq
2j – f’[q + VET – W*]
vdET +





The second order condition (3) implies that the denominator in these expressions is
positive so that an increase in the employee’s expected productivity T raises the wage offer.
To ensure that increases in the employee’s outside wage, ~, also the firm’s wage offer, it is
neassary and sufficient that
f’[q+vET–w*]-f<o (5)
which is consistent with (3) but imposm a more stringent requirement on f’.
As can be seen from (4), there is a special case where
productivity. This is the c=e where F is uniform so that




the wage offer is linear in expected
j’ is zero and f is a constant equal
In this c~e, (2) reduces to
(6)
7Because fl is zero and both (3) and (5) are trivially satisfied, (6) implies that the wage
is increasing in both ET and ~. For future reference it is useful to compute the resulting
profits using (l). These are
q–q+vETz
h( ~ ) (7)
I assume throughout the analysis that the worker’s productivity is no smaller in firm o
(or b) than in firm az so that q is no smaller than ~. This implies that, regardless of the
distribution F, the optimal wage always exceeds ~ and that F is positive so that there is
a strictly positive probability that the employee stays at firm o. It then follows that the
equilibrium wage is always below the employee’s expected productivity y E(q + vT). Note
also that the solution is interior as long as the highest possible n, which I label R and which
satisfies F(fi) = 1, also satisfies
f(~+fi)[q- ~- fi+vET]<l (8)
If condition (8) is satisfied, individuals leave firm o with positive probability. If it is
violated, the optimal wage is ~ + ii and the employee stays with probability one.
To compute the optimal wage, one must know the value of ET. I now compute these
values concentrating first on the value for firm o and then on firm 13.Firm o computes this
expectation knowing only the value of S. I suppose that, just like T, the signal S can take on
two values, zero and one. I let the unconditional probability that S is equal to one be equal
to the unconditional probability that T is equal to one and denote both these probabilities
by ~. Thus # denotes both the fraction of high productivity individuals and the fraction of
individuals who get a high S.
Since I wish the signal S to be informative about T, I assume that the probability that
S is equal to one conditional on T being equal to one, which I denote by u, exceeds ~.
It is important to note that this is a subjective probability concerning the accuracy of a
signal. Thus there is little to prevent different agents from using different values of u in their
calculations. In particular, I denote by a the subjective conditional probability of S held
by firms and by UWthe subjective conditional probability held by workers. To simplify the
8analysis, I also use u, the conditional probability believed by firms, to evaluate overall output
in this economy. Thus, in effect, I am pretending that u also represents the true frequency
with which a T equal to one is associated with an S equal to one. However, if one is willing
not to compute average values of output one would not need to decide whether any given
value of u is true and one could still learn how changes in people’s subjective probabilities
affect equilibrium wages.
Letting P denote probabilities, the expected value of T conditional on observing that S
is equal to one is
P(T=l IS= l)=
P(s= lIT= l)P(T= 1)
P(s = 1)
=0
while the expected value of T conditional on observing that S is equal to zero is
P(T= lls =0) =
P(S=OIT = l)P(T= 1) = (1 –a)#
P(s = o) 1–4
(9)
(lo)
Given that a exceeds ~, this latter probability is smaller and, indeed, it equals zero if the
signal S is perfectly discriminating so that a is equal to one. Even when it is not, the fact
that u exceeds # together with (4) implies that the equilibrium wage paid by o to employees
with an S equal to one, w;, exceeds the wage paid employees with an S equal to zero, w:.
I now consider the wage offered by firm bin the second period. I assume that R, the signal
observed by b, has characteristics very similar to those of S. In particular, the unconditional
probability that R is equal to one is ~. Also, firms believe that the probability that R is one
conditional on T being equal to one is u while workers believe this conditional probability
to be OW. I also assume that everyone believes that the realization of R is independent of
the realization of S once one conditions on the true value of T. In other words
P(R=lls =j, T=k)=P(R=l/T=k) where k,j = O,1
Before computing b’s expected value of T for individual workers, I study the probabilities
that, for a given worker, a signal S equal to
R equal to one (or zero). These conditional
one (or zero) will be followed by a signal
probabilities are important in determining
9whether individual workers quit their firm o jobs in the first period. They are also important
ingredients in calculating tl~e expected value of T by a b firm that has observed a particular
realization of R.
The probability that a signal S equal to one will be followed by an R equal to one is
P(R=l IS=l) = P(R=l, T=lIS=l) +P(R=l, T= OIS= 1)
= P(R=lIS =1, T=l)P(T =lIS=l)+P(R= lIS=l, T= O)P(T=OIS=l)
= ~2+(1-u)’4 =02+4 -2a4
l–~ l–~
(11)
while the probability that R will equal zero conditional on S being equal to one is equal to
1 minus the expression
S equals zero equals
in (11), Similarly, the probability that R will equal zero given that
P(R=OIS=O) = P(R=O, T=lIS=O) +P(R=O, T= OIS=O)
= P(R=OIS =0, T=l)P(T=l IS= O)+P(R =OIS=O, T= O)P(T=OIS=O)
= 4(1 -0)2
(12) + [1 - ~::;)]’= l.d+d(~)’
l–~
while the probability that R will equal one given that S is equal to zero is equal to 1 minus
the expression in (12).
Both the expression in (11) and that in (12) are increasing in o (given that a exceeds
~). The intuitive reason for this is that a higher u implia that both S and R are more
highly correlated with T. As a result, a higher o ensures that S and R are more highly
correlated wit h each other. Thus, if workers perceive that the value of a is high, they
expect the perceptions of future employers about their ability to be highly correlated with
the perception of their current employer. By contrast, if workers perceive a to be low, they
regard this correlation = low.
I now turn to firm h’s expectation of T for individuals with
one. Firm b does not observe the realization of S. However, it
worker whose R it observes has agreed to accept a job with al to
R equal to either zero or
can use the fact that the
make inferences about the
probability that the worker has had a signal S equal to one. If, in particular, the equilibrium
10is one where only workers whose S is equal to zero accept jobs with alternative firms in the
first period, firm b should infer that any worker whose R it observes must have had an S
equal to zero. Thus, the probability z that b should attach to finding an employee whose S
was equal to one depends on the type of equilibrium that prevails in period 1. I study the
form of this equilibrium further below. For the moment, I compute the expected values of
T under the alternate assumptions that S is known to equal 1 and that S is known to equal
zero. The expected value assuming that there is a probability z that S is equal to one is
then a simple weighted average of the two numbers that I compute here.
If S is known to equal one, the expected value of T of an employee whose R is equal to
one is
P(T=l IS=l, R=l) =
P(T=l, R=l IS=l) =P(R=l IT=l, S=l)P(T=lIS=l)




while the expected value of T for an employee whose R is equal to zero is
P(T=l, R= OIS=l)
P(T=lIS=l, R=O) = -
P(R=O(T= 1,S= l)P(T= 11S= 1)
P(R=OIS= 1) = P(R = 01S = 1)
0(1 –a)(l – ~)
=
(1 - #)* -(a - 4)*
(14)
On the other hand, if S is known to equal zero, the expected value of an employee whose
R is equal to zero is
P(T=lIS=O, R=O) =
P(R=OIT =1, S= O)P(T=l IS=O)
P(R = 01S = O)
(1 - U)*@(l - ~)
= (1 -@)’ +#(a-d)*
(15)
Since both the conditional and the unmnditional distributions of S and R are identical, the
expected value of T for an employee whose R is equal to one while his S is equal to zero is
the same as that of an employee whose S equals one and his R is equal to zero.
Simple calculations establish that the expression in (13) is no smaller than the expression
in (14) as long = u is no smaller than ~ and that the inequality is strict if u is strictly larger
11than ~. Similarly, the expression in (14) is strictly larger than the expression in (15) if o is
strictly larger than ~. Put simply, employees who get signals equal to one are deemed more
productive than individuals who get signals equal to zero.
Now suppose that firm b attaches a probability z to the event that the individual got an




0(1 – a)(l – ~)
(16)
a(a – ~) + 4(1 – ~) (1 - ~)’ -(0 - ~)’
while, if it sees a signal R equal to zero the expected T is
P(T=l IR=O)=Z
0(1 –0)(1 – ~) (1 - O)’@(l - ~)
(1-#) 2-(a-~)2+ (1-z) (l-#) 3+~(o-+)2
(17)
The expression in (16) exceeds that in (17) so that the expected value of T is larger for
employees whose R equals one. Thus, (4) together with the second order condition implies
that the wage paid by h to an employee with R equal to one, w;(z) exceeds the wage paid
to an employee whose R equals zero, w:(z). Moreover, both these wages are increasing in z,
the probability that an employee who takes a job at al gets a signal S equal to one.
1.3 Expected Second Period Compensation
Second period compensation differs from the second period wages paid by o and b because
the employee has the option of working at a2. In particular, if an employee gets a wage
offer w from either of these firms which is below ~ + n, he goes to work for a2 in the semnd
period, Thus, an employee who knows that his semnd period wage offer by either o or b is
equal to w has an expected compensation (including the value of the nonpecuniary utility
the employee gets on the job) of c(w) where the function c is given by
c(w) = F(?.O – g)w +
/~’r(~ +n)~~(n) (18)
The derivative of c(w) with respect to w is F(w – ~) which is strictly positive given that
q exceeds g. Thus, c(w) is strictly increasing in w. This is not surprising, an employee who
gets a higher wage offer can expect his compensation to be higher because he can afford to
12be choosier with the outside offers he accepts. Because F(w – ~) is an increasing function
of w, c(w) is actually a mnvex function of w. This convexity is particularly obvious in the
case where F is uniform. In this case, (18) becomes
c(w) = h(w – ~)w + /l’:(g +n)hdn
w-q
Carrying out the integration, this is
(19)
which is convex in w because when w is small the individual is relatively unlikely to stay at
the firm so that an incre~e in w has a relatively small effect. The reason this function falls
with h when w is equal to .! is that an increase in h lowers the mean of the value of outside
offers.
In the first period, an employee’s expected second period compensation depends also on
his expectation concerning the wage he will be offered by either o or b. To simplify this
analysis, I assume that the worker observes the realization of his signal S. 7 This means
that the employee knows the wage that o will offer him in the second period. 8 I label the
employee’s expectation of this wage w“(S) where depending on the realization of S, this
equals either w: or w;.
Now consider an employee who works at al in the first period. I denote his expected
compensation by c“(z, S). This compensation depends on the fraction z of employees in
firms like al whose S is eq’lal to one because this fraction determines the wages paid by b
in the second period. It also depends on the employee’s own S because this determinm the
employee’s subjective probability that his signal R will equal one. If his signal S equals one,
T1tis important, however, that he be unable to demonstrate to firm b that his S is equal to ‘ne.
‘Alternatively, one can assume that he has to infer his S, and thus his second period wage at o, from his
fir~t period wage. This gives the same equilibrium allocation M in the c=e where the employee observes S
directly as long as employees with different values for S get different first period wages. \Vhat complicates
the analysis of this c= is that the firm can now choose to pay all employees the same first period wage
so u to make it impossible for them to learn their realization of S. In the numerical simulations I have
done, I have not found any parameter combinations for which the firm would profit from this concealment of
information. Thus, for the parameters I have studied the equilibrium is the same whether employees observe
S directly or not.
13his expected compensation in the second period
Ca(z,l) = PW(R = 11s = l) C(W:(Z))
after working at al, c“(z, 1) is
+(1 – PW(R = 11s = l)) C(W:(Z))
(20)
where PW denotes probabilities computed using worker’s perceptions of a.
If, instead, his S is equ2,1 to zero, his expected compensation, Ca(z, O) is
Ca(z, o) = (1 – *DW(R = 0[s = O))c(w:(z)) + PW(R = 01s = O))c(w:(z))
= C(w:(z))[d – 4(01~_–#~)2] + C(w:(z))[l – 4 + #(;_–@@)2] (21)
Rather obviously, c’(z, 1) exceeds c’ (z, O). The main interest in these formulas, however, lies
in the way that c“(z, 1) and c“(z, O) change with aW. Differentiating (20) and (21), we obtain
dc’(z,l) Zuw – ~ ~
do. = l–#





al- -:[c(w:(z)) - C(w:(z))] <0 —
Thus, the belief that capitalists are more inaccurate (so that UWis low) leads workers
who get an S equal to one io expect lower wages on the outside while it leads workers who
get an S equal to zero to expect higher wages on the outside. In other words, a low value
of UWleads workers to regard both the current realization of S and the future realization of
R as likely to be mistaken. As UWfalls, workers deem it more likely that a high realization
of S will be followed by a low realization of R. Thus, an employee who gets a high S value
becomes less optimistic about his compensation on the outside. Similarly, an employ- with
a low S becomes less pessimistic about his compensation by b.
Before concluding this section, it is worth comparing the compensation an employee can
expect to get in the second period when he stays at o with what he can expect to get if he
leav= and joins al. This difference depends on what outsiders expect S to be for employees
who leave w well as on the employee’s actual value of S. To start with the simplest case,
suppose the employee gets an S equal to zero and outsiders expect all employees who leave to
14have an S equal to zero. In this case there is no difference between perception of S inside and
outside firm o. I will show that, when F is uniform and the employee’s perception of a, OW,
is the same as the firms’, the employee’s expected second period wage is the same at o than
outside. However, the convexity of the c(w) function implies that expected compensation is
larger on the outside.
If F is uniform and R is equal to one, (6) and (14) imply that the wage offer by b is equal
to
(22)
On the other hand, if R is equal to zero, (6) and (15) imply that this wage offer equals
Using (12) the expected wage offer is
(23)
(24)
which is the same as the wage offer that o will make in the second period. The reason the
expected wage offers are the same is that both o and b start out with the same information.
Thus, by the law of iterated expectations the expected value of b’s expectation of T is the
same as o’s expectation of T. Since, in addition, wages are linear in firm’s expectations of
T, the two expected wage offers are the same. While the expected wage offers are the same,
the employee gets a more variable wage offer by going to al than by staying at o. Since this
variability raises (19), the employee has a higher expected compensation on the outside.
An essentially identical analysis applim to the case where the employee draws an S equal
to one and in which outside employers expect the employee’s S to be equal to one. On the
other hand, when the employee’s S is equal to one and outside firms expect it to equal one
only with probability z where z is less than one, the expected second period wage is lower
at b than at o. Similarly, when the employee’s S is equal to zero and outside firms expect
it to be equal one with positive probability, the employee’s expected wage is higher on the
outside.
151.4 First Period Wages
I now turn to the way wages offered by o in the first period depend on the realization of S.
Any given realization of Sleads, aswe saw earlier, toan estimate ofT that is not changed
from the first to the second period. Thus, if paying awagew leadsan employee tostay, and
supposing the firm does not discount the future, the firm gains
q + VET(S)+ {F(w”(s) – g)[q + VET(S) – w“(s)]} – w. (25)
where wO(S) represents, once again, the optimal second period wage as a function of S
that I computed in Section 1. In this expression, the term in curly brackets is equal to the
maximized value of (1), it represents the expected second period profits from being able to
offer an employee with a particular S a wage w“(S) in the second period.
Assuming employees do not discount the future either, an employee who stays at firm o
expects a present value of total compensation over two periods equal to
w + C(w”(s))
By leaving, the employee can expect to earn a present value of total compensation equal
to
g+ n + Ca(z, s)
The employee thus leaves whenever his n is above the cutoff value n“(z, S, w) which is given
by
n“(z, s,w) = w + C(w”(s)) – g – Ca(z, s). (26)
Thus, firm o sets first period wages in order to maximize
F(w +C(WO(S)) – I- C“(2, S)){q +VET(S) + F(WO(S) – q)19+VET(S) - w“(s)] - W} (27)
In general, the wage that maximizes (27) depends both on z and on S so that I denote
this optimal wage by w*(z, S). Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition that
characterizes w“(z, S), is
f(~(z, s,W“(Z, s))){ q+vET(s)+F(w”(s) -q)[q+vET(s)-w”( s)]-w*(z,s)}-F(n(z, s,w*(z,s)))=o
(28)
16I am now in a position to describe the equilibrium for this model. Suppose we start with
a candidate value of z, which I call 5. Given this candidate z, one can solve (28) for w*(Z, S)
and use (26) to compute the optimal cutoffs for the two types. This allows one to compute
+F(n”(:, 1, W“(2, l)))
‘(z) = ~F(rz*(i,I, W*(i, l))) +(1 - @) F(rz*(2,0, w*(:, o)))
(29)
The denominator of this expression gives the fraction of all employms that leaves firm o
for given Z and wages w“(2, S). The numerator represents the fraction of all employees who
both leave firm o and have an S equal to one. The variable 2 therefore equals the fraction
z that results from 2 and the wage policy w“(5, S). In equilibrium, ;(2) must thus equal ;
itself. Because Z and i take values between zero and one and the ; function is continuous,
the Brewer fixed point theorem implies that there exists an equilibrium 2 which equals the
resulting 2. In general, there is no reason to suppose that there exists only one equilibrium
though, generically, the equilibria will be locally distinct. 9
To study how the equil~.brium wages vary with u*, one thus generally has to take into
account how the equilibrium z varies with UWas well. However, it is of interest to see how
wages would vary if z were fixed both to develop intuition and because there is a special
case where this applies directly. If z were fixed, one can see how wages vary simply by
differentiating (28) with respect to the wage and to c’. This gives
~~(z,s) = f - r{9 + ~~~(s) + ~(~”(s) - F)[q + ~~~(s) - ~“(s)l - ~}
de 2f – f’{q + VET(S) + F(w”(s)– q)[q + VET(S) – w“(s)] – w}
(30)
The second order condition implies that the denominator of this expression is positive
and, as long as a condition that is analogous to (5) is satisfied, the numerator is positive as
well. Then, an increase in expected outside compensation in the second period leads firm o
to raise its first period wage. Thus, in this case, a reduction in oW, which lowers c; and raises
~ lowers the wage associated with S equal to one, w“(z, 1), and raises the wage associated
‘Indeed Acemoglu and Piachke (1996) display multiplicities in a very similar model. The function 2 is
increuing because a high value of Z leads to high second period wages, which in turn leads to a high value
of 2. Multiplicities ariae if the slope of this function is greater then one for certain values of 2 while it is
smaller than one for others. In the numerical simulations reported below, the equilibrium turns out to be
globally unique.
17with S equal to zero, w“(z, O). Thus, as long M w“(O, 1) starts out being higher than w“(O, O)
an increase in UWraises the gap between the highest and lowest wages paid inside firm o.
This gap between the highest and lowest firm paid inside a firm corresponds, broadly, to
the variability of wages inside firms. The analysis above also implies that an even simpler
measure of inequalit y increases with OW.This simpler measure is the gap between the highest
and lowest first period wage paid in the economy which, given that the economy contains
only three wages also corresponds broadly to measures such as the interdecile range. In the
model, the lowest wage paid is ~ so this measure of inequality rises whenever w’(z, 1) rises,
Because the denominator of (3o) is positive, it follows that the optimal wage cannot rise
by as much as c= itself. Given (26), this implies that a rise in c“ unambiguously lowers the
cutoff n at which employees leave and, as a result, it raises the number of quits. Therefore,
a reduction in UWincreases the turnover of employees whose S is equal to zero while it raises
the turnover of employees whose S is equal to one.
I now turn to the question of whether, as required above for inequality within firms to
rise, the first period wage of employees whose S is equal to one exceeds that of employees
whose S is equal to zero. A higher S implies a higher ET and this unambiguously raise the
terms in curly brackets in both (27) and in (28). As in the analysis of (4), this raises the
optimal wage. On the other hand, employees whose S is equal to one can expect a higher
second period wage in firm o if they remain and, because their probability of getting an R
equal to one is larger, they also anticipate a higher value for c“(z, S). The former raises
the cutoff n in (26) while the latter lowers it. Thus, with (5) satisfied, the former tends
to reduce w“(z, 1) relative to w“(z, O) while the latter tends to increase it. Thus, the fact
that CO(WO(S))goes up for employees who infer that their S is equal to one introduces some
ambiguity in the relationship between w“(z, 1) and W*(z, O).
I now show that, in the case of F uniform, the effect of the increase in CO(WO(S))is
quantitatively less important than the other two effects so that, w“(z, 1) is indeed larger
than w’(z, O). In the uniform c~e, substituting the wage in (6) into (19) and using (7), (28)
18becomes
h[q+vET +h(q-~; vET)2-w]-h[w+ ;(q-~; vET)2
so that the optimal wage is
+ * –C’(z, s)] = o
h q–~+vET 2
2w=q+vET –;+ca(z, S)+z( ~ ) (31)
For a given Ca(z, S), this is clearly increasing in ET so that w“(z, 1) would exceed w“(z, O)
if employees with different wages expected their outside compensation in the second period
to be the same. In fact, employees with S equal to one expect a higher second period
compensation on the outside and this too raises w“(z, 1) relative to w*(z, O).
I now provide some intuition for the result that, for constant z and under the conditions
I have laid out, increases in UWraise the relative turnover of high S individuals together with
their relative wages. Figure 1 helps one interpret these results. This figure shows the labor
supply curve given, implicitly, by (26). This is a labor supply curve because a higher wage
leads workers to have a higher cutoff n’ so that the fraction of this type of workers staying at
the firm, F(nc), rises. The firm then has a conventional monopsony problem in which there
is a marginal cost of labor that lies above the labor supply curve and a marginal revenue
from an additional unit of labor which, in this case, is horizontal. The equilibrium cutoff
is the one that ensures that marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue and the equilibrium
wage ensur= that this cutoff is on the labor supply curve.
An increase in c’ for this worker (which would result if the employee had an S equal to
zero and Uw fell) would shift the labor supply curve to the left because it raises what the
worker can expect to earn outside and thus it makes departures more attractive. This leads
to a reduction in the cutoff, so that more workers of this type leave in equilibrium and, at
least for linear labor supply, also leads to an increme in the equilibrium wage. An incre~e in
OWlowers c’ for workers with S equal to zero while raising it for those with S equal to one,
so that it moves the labor supply curve of employees with S equal zero to the right while
it mov= that of employees with S equal to one to the left. It thus increases the relative
turnover and wages of high S workers.
19The question is then whether taking into account the endogeneity of z changes these
results. It is easy to see that, even with endogenous z, either the labor supply curve of
workers with S equal to one must move to the left or that of employees with S equal to
zero must move to the right. The reason is that changes in z move both curvm in the same
direction. For instanm, increases in z move both labor supply curves to the left since they
raise the value of c“ for both sets of employees.
There is actually one interesting case where the assumption that z does not change when
UWchanges is appropriate. This is the case where employees with S equal to one have such
high productivity that firm o is led to pay them a wage that keeps them at firm o with
probability one. In other words, in this case, w“(O, 1) is not an interior solution but rather,
is the wage that ensures that the cutoff (26) is given by n. Thus,
As long as the
zero for arbitrarily
W“(o,l) = fi+q+ Ca(o,l) – C(w”(l))
cutoff for employees with S equal to zero is lower, z is zero and remains
small changes in OW.The earlier analysis implies that a small reduction in
aW raises C=(O,O) and lowers c“(O, 1). The above equation now implies immediately that the
wage for employees with S equal to one falls while, given the cond itions discussed earlier, the
wage w“(O, O) must rise so that inequality within the firm falls. While turnover for high S
employees does not change in this case, those with S equal to zero leave firm o with increased
probability.
Z Social Efficiency
In this section I ask whether the allocation of labor is more efficient when workers have a
higher value of UW.For the purposes of this analysis, I ignore distributional issues altogether.
In other words, I ask simply whether equilibria with different values of OWproduce a larger
amount of total social output. The natural definition of social output in the model, which
I will label Q includ= both the output produced in firms for sale in the market, which I
will label Q and the nonpecuniary benefits earned by workers, particularly since the two are
20comparable in the worker’s eyes.
An increase in O does not, of course, guarantee that the allocation is Pareto superior and,
indeed, it generally will not be since some workers will see their wages rise while others will
see their wages decline. An increase in this output measure suggests that a Pareto superior
allocation would be obtaine,ble if one had access to lump sum transfers but, if these really
were possible, the distributional concerns which are the heart of this paper would not be
very important. Nonetheless, it is useful to know whether increasing trust in capitalism by
increasing fYW raises, in some sense, the total value of the pie that is produced. Because these
are more readily observable measures, it is also of interest to study the effect of changes in
OWon the value of market output Q and on the value of the average first period wage, which
equals
w = q+ ~[hn”(z, 1)(?.0”(2, 1) - q)] + (1 - ~)[hn”(z, o)(w”(z, o) - g)] (32)
In particular, it is worth knowing whether the change in market output Q or in the average
first period wage is a good indicator of the change in Q.
When a worker with a given ET works at either o or b, market output is q + vET. I
suppose that when he works at either al or a2, his market output is g so that his social
10 Because workers voluntarily decide output inclusive of nonpecuniary benefits is ~ + n.
whether to stay at o or b, their decisions involve cutoff values for n; workers whose n is below
the cutoff stay while the others leave. From a social point of view it is also optimal to have
cutoffs for n. In particular, if it is optimal for workers with given values for their signals
and a given n to leave their employers, it follows that all workers with the same signals and
higher values of n should leave as well. Similarly, if workers with given signals and a given
n should stay, so should all workers with lower values of n.
In equilibrium, there are six cutoff values of n. First, there are two cutoffs at b in the
second period associated with R being equal to either zero or one. I label these n: and n!
respectively. Second, there are two cutoffs at o in the second period ~sociated with S being
1°Asnoted in footnote 5, ~ cculd in principle also include the rents from learning the value of the signal
R. If it did include these rents, however, ~ would change with z so the earlier analysis would have to be
modified.
21equal to either zero or one. I label these n: and n: respectively. Finally, there are the two
cutoffs at o in period one associated with S being either zero or one and these I label no and
nl.
Before computing O and Q as a function of these six cutoffs, it is worth computing social
and market output of a worker at o (or b) in the second period assuming that the worker’s
expected T is given by ET and that the cutoff is given by n’. Market output is simply
q + F(?zc)(q + VET – Q)
while social output is
g + F(nc)(q + vET) – ~) + J= ndF(n)
In the uniform case this equals
u(nc, ET) = ~ + * + hnC(q + vET – ~) – h(nC)2/2 (33)
so that the derivative of social output with respect to n’ is
h(q + VET – q – n’) (34)
Total output thus increases with the cutoff n’ as long as output inside the firm, q + vET,
is larger than ; + n’, the output outside the firm for the cutoff value of n’. Because social
output is a concave function of nc, the optimal cutoff is the one where these two values of
output are equal.
Now consider the social output of an employee with S equal to one, If he stays in o, his
output in the first period is q + vu while his expected output in the second period is u(n~, a).
If he goes to al, his output in the first period is ~ + n. With probability P(R = 1IS = 1)
his expected output in the second period is u(n~, E(TIR = 1, S = 1)) while with probability
P(R = 01S = 1) it is w(n~, E(TIR = 0,S = l)). Thus, in the uniform case, overall expected
output for such an employee is
QI = hnl(q+va+w(n~, a)) +~’’’’h(~+n+P(R= 11S= l)u(n~, E(TIR= 1,S= 1))
+P(R = 01S = l)l(n~, E(TIR = 0,S = l)))dn (35)
22while his market output equals
Q, = 2q+hn,(q+va-I+hn;(q+ vu-q))
+(1 - hn,)[P(R = 11s = l)hn; (q + VE(T[R = 1,s = 1) – g)
+P(R = 01s = l)hn:(q + VE(TIR = 0,s = 1) – q)]
The derivative of ~1 with respect to nl is
h(q+vo–~–n~) + {h[u(n~, u) –P(R= 11S = l)w(n~, E(TIR= 1,S = 1)) –
P(R = 01s= 1)W(7Z:,E(TIR = 0,s = 1))]} (36)
The first term in this expression is the efficiency gain that occurs in period 1 when the
value of output inside the firm, q + VO, exceeds the output outside at the cutoff value of n,
I + nl, The term in curly brackets represents the benefits in terms of second period output
that result from having an ~.dditional employee at o instead of at al, An analogous argument
to the one used to derive (35) establishes that overall expected output from an employee
with an S equal to zero is
00 = hno(q+v





h~+n+P(R= 11S = O)u(n~, E(TIR = 1,S = O))
+P~R = 01S = O)u(n~, E(TIR = 0,S = O))) (37)
which has a derivative with respect to no equal to
h(q+v(l ‘a)+ -9-nl) + {h[u(n~ (1 ‘U)d
1–4 1’ l–~
) - P(R = 11S= O)u(n~, E(TIR = 1, S=0)) -
P(R = 01S = O)u(n:, E(TIR = 0,S = O))]} (38)
Total expected output is then
while total market output is
Q = dQI + (1 - #)Qo
23where Q. is computed analogously to Q1.
We saw earlier that changes in u~ affect nl and nz and this obviously results in changes
in overall output. Below, I compute these effect on output but it is important to realize that,
in general, there are additional output effects from changes in aW. In particular, whenever
changes in aWaffect z, firms of type 6 change their wage offers in the second period. This, in
effect, changes the cutoffs values n: and n: and this h= additional welfare effects. Thus, my
numerical analysis looks at three different measures to assess the effect of av on efficiency.
First, I look at h(q + vET – ~ – nl) and h(q + vET – ~ – nO) to see the period one output
effects of changes in aW. Then, I look at the derivatives of the form of (36). I also compute
the derivative of O with respect to aW taking into account the changes in z. 11 Using the
same method, I also compute the derivative of Q with respect to aW.
The use of simulations also allows me to compute changes in different measures of in-
equality. So far, I have concentrated on the gap between the highest and lowest wage paid
inside firm o and the gap between the highest and lowest first period wage paid in the econ-
omy. Here, I consider two additional measures. The first is the ratio of the average wage
earned by employees whose S equals one, which I denote by ws=l, to ws=o, the average wage
earned by employ~s whose S equals zero. If S were observable, this would be a natural
estimate of the inequality between people whose S differs. The second measure I consider is
the variance of the logarithm of first period wages. Both of these measures can be computed
using variants of the method used to compute average wages in (32).
Table 1 presents the results for four combinations of parameters. All these numerical
exercises are carried out assuming that q and g are equal to one, while a is equal to .9 and h
is equal to 1.5. As can be seen from the table, the first three experiments involve a ~ equal
to .7 while the last involves a smaller ~. The parameter v equals 1 in the first column, 2
in the second and 3 in the last two. In all four simulations, the first period wage is higher
for employees with S equals to one and rises with u~, even when taking into account the
11I compute this derivative by first computing the equilibrium z and the resulting Q when u is equal to
UWand then recomputing these values for a slightly smaller value of UW.
24endogenous response of z. Thus, the ratio of the highest to lowest first period wage paid in
the economy rises. In addition, increases in UWraise the ratio of the highest to the lowest
wage paid inside firm o and also raise the average wage earned by people whose S equals
one relative to the average wage earned by people whose S equals zero. The variance of log
wages, on the other hand, doa not always increase tbough it increases in three of the four
combinations considered.
The main qualitative difference between these simulations is that increases in aW lead to
different output effects for different parameter values. As can be seen from the information
in the first two rows of the table, the first column is unique in representing a situation where
v is sufficiently low that even high S employees leave firm o with positive probability. I
report only one such simulation because all of those I have computed have qualitatively
similar properties to that reported in column one. In particular, they involve declines in
both overall output and in market output in response to increases in aW.
The reason for this turns out to be that an increase in UWreduces the turnover of em-
ployees with S equal to zero while raising the turnover of employees with S equal to one.
Unfortunately, the turnover of these latter employees is socially more costly. This can be seen
by analyzing the first period benefits from increasing the cutoff n for both sets of employees.
The general formula for these first period benefits is given in (34) though it reduces to the
simpler formula in the eigh ~h and ninth rows in the case where q is equal to ~. The entries
in these rows show that social output rises in the first period when the cutoff for either type
of employee is increased, tbough it rises more with the cutoff for employees whose S equals
one. The reason for this discrepancy is that (31) implies that, leaving everything else equal,
firm o only increases the wages of employees with S equal to one by one half of their extra
productivity. This means that the gap between the actual productivity of an employee and
the wage he is paid (which is what determines whether he leaves) is larger for more produc-
tive employees. The result is that there is a bigger social gain when the retention rate for
these employees goes up and this can be accomplished by lowering aW.
The second column shows a situation where the higher value of v ensures that employees
25with S equal to one are retained with probability one by firm o. Then, social output increases
with CTW because such increases reduce the turnover of employees with S equal to zero (while
having no local effect on the turnover of employees whose S equals one). Qualitatively
identical results arises when, as in the third column, v is incre~ed further so that it equals
3.
The main purpose of the third column is to permit comparison with the last column,
which keeps v equal to 3 w-bile lowering #. This changes the results dramatically because
overall output now declines when UWgoes up. This is true even though first period overall
output still rises when turnover by employees with S equal zero is reduced and even though
the increase in UWdoes reduce turnover. The reason for the decline in O is that the derivative
given in (38) is negative because the social value of having employees with S equal to zero
outside firm o in the second period is lower than having them inside firm o. The reason for
this is that, as I discussed earlier, social output is a concave function of nb and having the
employee be outside the firm induces randomness in his cutoff depending on the realization
of R.
Another interesting fea:ure of the last column is that the decline in overall output is
accompanied by an incre~e in market output, as well as by an increase in average first
period wages. Thus these simple measures are not good indicators of overall output. In this
c~e, the principal source of loss is that, because employees are more attached to their original
employer, they are less likely to get high nonpecuniary benefits from alternate employers.
In conclusion, there are robust examples where an increase in OWraises inequality while,
at the same time lowering overall output. Thus, the increase in inequality that results from
the changes in beliefs that I am considering would be detrimental even if lump sum transfers
were available. In addition, there are cases where overall output falls even though measured
GNP rises so that simple measures cannot be used to gauge the welfare effects of the changes
in beliefs.
263 Observable Characteristics
So far I have treated the signals S and R as observed privately by firms and their employees.
Thus the increase in first period wage inequality I derived must be thought of as an increme
in the inequality within groups with identical observable characteristics. I now show that
the analysis developed above can, in principle, apply also to changes in inequality betw~n
groups that differ in observable ways. A general treatment of this issue is beyond the scope
of this paper. In this section I show only that a special case exists where the analysis in
the earlier sections applies unchanged so that an increase in UWleads to increased inequality
between groups.
I suppose that there is a signal e which, again, takes either a value of zero or one. This
signal, which can be thought of as an indicator of education, is correlated with T in the sense
that
P(T=lle =l)>P(T=lle= O). (39)
I also assume that the indicator e is correlated with S so that
P(S=l\e =l)>P(S=lle=O) (40)
Thus, education is both positively correlated with actual productivity and with the signal
of productivity S.
I now give an example where, in spite of (39), wages depend only on S and R as before.
One feature of this example is that, consistent with Figure 2,
P(T=llS =1, e=l)=P(T=llS=l)
In Figure 2, the set of events where S is equal to one is given
(41)
by the union of the sets
whose areas are A, B, D and E. The set of events where e is equal to one is given by the
union of the are= A, B and C, while the set of events where T is equal to one is given by
the union of A, D and E. Thus, the probability that T is one, conditional on both C and e
being equal to one is A/(A + B) while the probability that T is one conditional on just S
27being equal to one is (A+ D)/(A + B + D + E). Thus, (41) is satisfied as long as
AD —=—
BE
Note that the Figure is consistent with (39) because the probability that T is one condi-
tional on e being one, A/(A + B + C), is larger than the unconditional probability that T is
one which is given by (A+ D + E)/(A + D + E + G). On the other hand, the probability that
T is one conditional on S being one is, given the above equation, A/(A + B). This means
that S is a strictly better indicator of T than is e (since the conditional probability that T
is one is strictly larger when S is one than when only e is known to equal one. Because the
events where e indicates that 2’ is one are also events where S indicates the same thing, e is
superfluous so that firm o need look only at S to determine an employee’s productivity.
As long ~ firm b observes S, the wages it pays then depend only on S and R so that e
is superfluous for b as well. While I have assumed that S is not directly observable by b, S
becomes known in equilibrium to b as long as the parameters are such that only employees
with S equal to zero ever leave firm o. Then, firm b knows that any employee it hires has
an S equal to zero and can safely neglect information contained in e. Thus, the equilibria
studied in earlier sections for these combinations of parameters continue to be equilibria even
when the signal e is available,
An econometrician who does not observe S will tend to compute wages conditional on e.
The average wage conditional on e being equal to one is
A+B c
‘e=l=A+B+C ‘s=l+A+B+Cws=O
while that condition on e being equal to zero is
D E+F+G
‘e=O=D+E+F+G ‘s’l+D+E+F+Gws=O
where G represents the area of points where T, S and e equal one and where, given the way
the figure is drawn (40) is satisfied because
A+B D
A+B+C ‘D+ E+F+G
28This condition implies that the ratio W.=l /w.=O rises with the ratio w,s=l/ Ws=o, Since
this latter ratio rises with OWin all the simulations reported in Table 1, the “education




way of demonstrating the empirical validity of the model in this paper would be to
show that holding constant the productivity of individuals, the distribution of income is more
unequal when people feel that pay is less related to productivity. Unfortunately, neither cross-
section nor time series data on peoples’ opinions about the connection of pay to productivity
appears to exist. What does exist is data on peoples’ opinions about the desirability of
income dispersion in general and about the extent to which they want redistribution to
increase. In addition there is, of course, data on political outcomes in different places at
different points in time.
In this section, I discuss data of this sort and relate it to the actual distribution of income.
I consider both data across countries at a point in time and, to a much lesser extent data
over time for the United States. Figure 3 focuses on seven countries at a point in time. It
shows the relationship between the attitudes towards inequality from a 1987 international
survey as well as inequality measures from around the same period. 13
The horizontal axis of this figure gives the fraction of people who agree with the statement
that “Differences in income in [respondent’s country] are too large”. These figures are drawn
from Evans (1993) which reports the results of a 1987 survey which asked the same set of
14 On the vertical axis, the figure gives questions in the seven countries reported in the figure.
12Note that this analysis is agnostic w to whether education helps in raising S or T. In other words,
the analysis takes the joint diat ribu tion of T, S and e as given without inquiring as to the determinants
of any of these variables. One can thus imagine that the correlation between S, T and e is due in part to
the productivity enhancing effect of education, as long M one accepts that after the education is completed,
firms have access to a signal of productivity that is better than the individual’s educational diploma. Or,
one can imagine that e is typically high for able individuals simply because these enjoy education more.
13Memura of inequality are not available for every year although this problem may not be extremely
severe because inequality changes relatively slowly.
14The only other country included in the survey was Hungary which I excluded because I felt that the data
on actual inequality was probably not very meaningful in the during its post-communist transformation.
29the Gini coefficient for household pre-t ax income. These figures are drawn from Deininger
and Squire (1995) who report inequality measures from a number of sources. To help make
these figures comparable, I used figures from the LIS data base ( Atkinson, Rainwater and
Smeeding, 1995) for all the countries for which these figures were available, namely for all
countries except Austria and Australia. 15 The correlation between these figures is -.72.
Such a negative correlation fits with the model presented earlier if one regards the opinion
that inequality is too large as closely related to the opinion that pay does not correspond to
performance.
There are, of course, akernative interpretations. One possibility is that the perception
of large inequities leads to policies which cause actual inequality. This too would make the
widespread perception of inequity lead to a relatively even distribution of income. But, if
this theory were valid, the perceptions would affect incomes only through their effect on
policies.
One way these policies could be leading to the negative correlation in figure 3 is by
affecting the measured income distribution itself. The measure of pre tax household income
on which my Gini coefficients are based includes some government transfers and cash transfers
to poor people might be larger in countries where people dislike inequality more. I have thus
also looked at OECD meas~res of the distribution of labor earnings. The coverage of these
data is not uniform for the seven countries in my sample. For Austria, the U.K. and the U.S.,
the figures appear to be comparable and the ratio D9/D5 is largest in the U.S., intermediate
in the U.K. and smallest in Austria. The D5/Dl ratio is highest in the U.S. and lower for
the U.K. and Austria, though the latter two numbers are essentially identical. These figures
are broadly consistent with the Gini coefficients for pre-tax income.
Another source of potential endogeneity, is that high income people might work less in
countries where people dislike inequality more because they are subject to more taxation.
151 picked, for each country the observation that was closest to 1987. The data for Switzerland me from
1982, those for Germany are from 1983, those for Norway, the U.K. and the U,S. are from 1986 and those for
Ireland and the Netherlands are from 1987. The Australian data come from the 1989 Statistical Yearbook
for Australia while those for Austria, whine data are probably the least comparable to the others, comes
from 1987.
30In fact, it is not clear that the countries in my sample in which people dislike inmme
inequality have particularly progressive income taxes. In particular, the correlation of the
Gini coefficients based on after tax household income (all of which come from the LIS data
base) with the Evans’ measure is only -.40.
When people say that they think inequality is excessive, they could have many different
things in mind. For instance, they might feel that the differences in income are due to
differences in social contributions but that differences in social contributions do not warrant
large income disparities. In particular, they might be unhappy if differences in raw abilities
(= opposed to in effort) lead to large differences in income. It is also possible that, as in
my theory, they dislike
not reflect differences in
which allow one to sort
income inequality because they feel that differences in income do
productivity. Unfortunately, I am unaware of international surveys
out the relative importance of these perceptions in explaining the
differences in attitudes portrayed in Figure 3. In any event, and as I expound on in the
conclusion, I regard my theory as only a first attempt at showing that beliefs about inequality
matter and hope that related models can explain why other changes in attitudes towards
inequality have similar effects.
Because it corresponds most closely to the belief that pay does not reflect performance,
I focused attention on the survey which asked whether people thought income disparities
were excessive. It is important to note, however, that the answer to this question is strongly
positively correlated with the answer to questions that ask whether people favor additional
redistribution from the rich to the poor. Evans (1993) reports a measure which gives the
mean response to questions ~king people whether they would like the unemployed to receive
a guaranteed standard of living, whether they support more spending on benefits for the
poor, whether they support a guarant~ of jobs for everyone and whether they are in favor
of a basic income for everyone. With a higher means score representing less enthusiasm for
redistribution, the correlation between this mean score and the answer plotted in Figure 3
is -.80. Similarly, the mean score against redistribution has a correlation of .78 with the
pre-tax Gini coefficient and of .52 with the after-tax coefficient.
31Time series evidence on attitudes towards income inequality seems even harder to obtain.
This is particularly surprising given that many political analysts have noted a ‘shift to the
right” in U.S., British and Canadian electoral outcomes. In all three countries, the late
1970’s and early 1980’s saw the election of leaders like Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher
and Brian Mulroney whose rhetoric was substantially more ‘pro-market” than that of their
predecessors. The only U.S. data that confirms that this wa-s accompanied by a change in
people’s attitude towards redistribution are reported in I<luegel and Smith (1986). They
conducted a national survey in 1980 and found that only 1S70 of their respondents disagreed
with the statement that the U.S. was spending too much on welfare. As they say, this is
substantially smaller than the 3970 of the people who agreed, in a 1969 survey conducted
by Feagin (1975), that the “U.S.was spending too little on welfare. This comparison suffers
from several difficulties not the le~t of which is that the public perception of government
policies might have been different in the two instances.
In spite of the paucity of attitudinal data, it may be reasonable to suppose that the
change in electoral outcomes in these three countries is suggestive of an increased confidence
in the free market system. If so, it is tempting to think about whether the incre~ed income
inequality in these three countries over the last 20 years couple is partially due to this
change in attitudes. What makes this explanation attractive is that, as Moss (1995) shows,
inequality h= worsened disproportionately in these three countries (together with Australia).
By contrast countries in continental Europe such as France, Italy and Germany have seen
their earnings inequality fall. And, interestingly, leaders in these countries appear not to
have shifted nearly as much towards a free market rhetoric. 16
Thus the increase in United States income inequality surveyed in Levy and Murnane
(1992), which involves incremed dispersions in wages both within groups of similar educa-
tional attainment as well as across groups that differ in their education, could be due to a
‘6This is no place for a thorough survey of the extensive literature on the forces that have recently affected
the income distribution in a variety of countries. It is worth mentioning one complementary view here; namely
that free-market oriented leaders have worsened the income distribution in their countries by reducing the
influence of unions. For a discussion of this possibility see Freeman and Katz (1994).
32change in beliefs about the fairness of the free enterprise system. This explanation is consis-
tent with a remarkable change in workers’ attitudes towards their employers. As Uchitelle
(1994) reports citing a study by Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, workers no longer view
big business m an adversary. They do not blame their employers for the anxiety that they
feel about their income and job security. Instead, workers regard their employers as victims
of global competition which forces employers to cut costs and lay off workers.
Thus, interestingly, international competition may have increased income inequality via
two mechanisms. The first and more traditional one, is that this competition may have
reduced the demand for low skilled workers, The second is that the existence of this inter-
national competition may have convinced workers that their employers are not being unfair
when they cut wages. This, in turn, may have exacerbated inequality through a mechanism
akin to the one presented in this paper.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented a first attempt at understanding how changes in workers’ conception of
the capitalist system affect the distribution of income. The main contribution of the paper
is that it shows that changes in beliefs can have a direct effect on the distribution of income
even if they do not affect the inherent productivity or the effort of any worker. 17.
This result is based on considering a particular change in beliefs, namely a change in
the extent to which people believe employers are accurate in their assessment of individual
productivity. This is related to peoples’ general attitude towards income inequality because
a belief that employers are inaccurate and whimsical in deciding who should get a high wage
is presumably associated with a dislike for the income inequality that results from these
decisions. The main issue that is left unaddressed is whether the results in this paper extend
to changes in attitudes towards income inequality that stem from other sourcm. It would
be interesting to know whether a related model would predict that the income distribution
17By contrast, most of the modern theoretical literature on income distribution makes the distribution of
income vary only = a result of changes in actual the inherent productivity y of different workers. For a recent
example and some references, see Acemoglu (1995)
33depends also on the extent to which people believe that people whose productivity differs
ought to earn different levels of income. One possible model along these lines might be
constructed by extending P.kerlof’s (1982) ‘(gift exchange” model. In that model, worker
effort depends on the relation between the wage paid and the “reference wage” and firms
maximize profits by taking into account this relationship, As social notions of fairness
change, the relevant reference wage may change as well. In particular, an increased belief
that more productive people should be paid more might lower the reference wage for low
skilled workers while raising that for skilled workers. And, in turn, this might widen income
disparities.
Another issue that deserves further attention is the way workers modify their beliefs
about the appropriateness of the income distribution. In part, this would require modeling
the learning of workers along lines similar to Piketty (1995). In addition, it is worth thinking
about changes in society that tight have relatively rapid effects on these beliefs. Suppose,
for instance, that a new technology is introduced and that it is apparent to workers and firms
that only some people can use this technology effectively. Or, along the same lines, global
competition makes raise the relative value of the output of certain workers. If workers come
to feel that employers are able to determine the identity of those workers whose productivity
is enhanced by either technical progress or international competition, they are in effect
increasing their trust in the connection between pay and productivity.
The other element that has been left out of the model is the effect of ideological changes
on the institutions that are determined in the political arena. If workers perceive capitalism
as fair, they are more likely to vote for representatives that uphold capitalist institutions,
engage in less redistribution and, quite possibly, try to reduce the influence of unions. These
institutional changes, particularly the reduction in union power, would presumably affect
the income distribution as well. It then becomes important to disentangle the direct effects
of changes in ideology from those brought about indirectly through changes in political
institutions.
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